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Introduction
Sri Lanka is a plural society of three major ethnic groups, Sinhala, Tamil, and 
Moors (Muslims).  The majority Sinhalese make up 73% of the population.  They 
speak Sinhalese and are mainly Buddhists.  “Sri Lankan Tamils” represent 13% of the 
total; they are concentrated largely in the Northern and Eastern provinces, although 
one-third of them have lived for generations in the rest of the geographical areas (or 
“South”).1)  Both groups have lived in the country for less than 1,000 of the more than 
2,000 years of the country’s history.  There has been a great amount of interaction, 
sharing, and amicable cohabitation between Sinhalese and Tamils in the island.  The 
intermingled features in literature, rituals, ceremonies, inter-marriages, and various 
other factors give evidence of mutual respect and tolerance.  In spite of these positive 
interactions between ethnic groups in Sri Lanka, an ethnic conﬂict irrupted as a war in 
1983.  A Tamil guerrilla organization, the Liberation Tigers for Tamil Elam (LTTE), 
have been combating against the Sri Lankan government for the last twenty ﬁve years 
demanding a separate state, “Tamil Elam” for Tamils in the northern and eastern parts 
of the country.  The objective of this study is to explore the complexities of the 
conﬂict, and how the kinetics generated from the interplay between the parties to the 
conﬂict affects the mediator and vice versa.  The contextual factors inﬂuencing the 
choice and diversity of mediation strategy and behavior can be understood within a 
general framework.  This framework organizes the dimensions of the process of medi-
ation into temporal sequences that depict the interplay among prior conditions that 
are antecedent to mediation, the actual process of mediation, and subsequent out-
comes.2)
Its graphical depiction is shown on the next page.
This paper begins with an analysis of the efforts taken for truce and negotiation be-
tween the parties.  Analysis of the procedural factors to the conﬂict mediation is main-
ly condensed in the second part of the paper where Norwegian mediation is discussed 
in particular.
Methodology
Mediation is a dynamic process where success and failure are dependent not only 
on the identity of the mediator or the strategies employed, but also on a number of 
factors that relate to the parties involved, the issues at stake, and the context of their 
interaction.3)  Therefore, the methodology to be employed to research this complex 
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process needs to be carefully considered.  “Mediation” is in part a process in which 
you barely ﬁnd any meaningful way to quantify its progress, the complex human rela-
tions between parties, as well as many types of public responses.  Therefore, the pri-
mary research methodology employed in this study was qualitative, using interviews, 
ﬁeld observation, and participant observation.  Formal one-on-one interviews, infor-
mal one-on-one interviews, and group interviews were used together with informal 
meetings akin to focus groups.  The research was supplemented by the collection of 
documents, sometimes needing to be translated, and observations of artefacts (on the 
street, at historical sites, etc.).  I realized the public as well as the leaders were more 
comfortable with informal, relaxed discussions.  So I chose that as the main means of 
gaining their opinions.  The ﬁeld study has been undertaken both in Norway and in 
Sri Lanka during July and August of 2004.  In the ﬁeld I employed a number of re-
search techniques ranging from observation and formal interviews to informal interac-
tions.  I conducted nearly twenty formal interviews in both countries.  The informants 
for the interviews were drawn from all social strata involved in the peace process.  The 
structure set out for the interviews of each individual varied according to the inter-
viewee’s role in the mediation process.  Informal interactions were helpful in my at-
tempt to get an “emic” approach to have an insider’s view of the on-going peace pro-
cess.  I remained attentive to the unfolding events, rallies, protest gatherings, political 
events, media debates, press conferences, and seminars in both countries which were 
directly and indirectly related to the said mediation process.  Secondary data from 
newspapers, amendments, and web sites also served as modes of information, invalu-
ably.
External Efforts for Negotiation
The ﬁrst international interference in the Sri Lankan conﬂict was made in 1984, by 
India when Indira Gandhi was in power.  An all-party conference facilitated by India 
was held in 1984.  The “Tamilnadu” factor being the most inﬂuential one, Gandhi had 
to extend either a supportive or a neutral policy towards the activities of Tamil rebel-
lions in “Tamilnadu.”  The Indian-initiated peace talks soon collapsed.
The Sri Lankan government withdrew reasoning on India’s dual policy.  Tamil reb-
els also expressed dissatisfaction in peace talks and withdrew.  In Rajeev Gandhi’s era, 
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India insisted on a ceaseﬁre to commence peace talks.
For the ﬁrst time, all of the involved parties could be summoned for peace talks. 
That was the 1985 “Thimpu” talks in Bhutan.  In the midst of difﬁcult talks, both par-
ties violated the ceaseﬁre agreement and sabotaged the discussions.  One important 
outcome of the “Thimpu” talks was the agreement between the Sri Lankan govern-
ment and the Indian government to continue this understanding to seek a political so-
lution for the conﬂict.
Internal Efforts for Negotiation
In the early 1990s President R. Premadasa pioneered for the second attempt at ne-
gotiations for which the LTTE initially assisted.  These negotiations lasted nearly a 
year and half, and ceased when Premadsa was assassinated by the LTTE in 1992.  In 
the 1994 general election, Chandrika Kumaranathunge pledged constitutional reform 
to solve the conﬂict politically.4)  Her regime started with a revival of peace.  The 
LTTE declared a ceaseﬁre showing their interests in peace.  In spite of this positive re-
sponse, the truce and discussion period suddenly broke down after a single year, when 
the LTTE blew up two boats of the Sri Lankan Navy at Trincomalee base.  Providing 
reasons for the collapse of the truce, Anton Balasingham, the theoretician and advisor 
of the LTTE, claimed that the written exchanges failed to clear and create mutual trust. 
Indeed, the letters exchanged contributed to a gradual build up of distrust and hostili-
ty, and also helped to reinforce the mutually entrenched positions widening the gap 
between the protagonists.5)
Norwegian Mediation in Sri Lankan Conﬂict
Towards the late 1990s, both parties to the conﬂict realized that an intervention by 
a genuine outside party was a crucial option to transcend the internal political turmoil 
and deteriorating trust between the parties.  In 1998 the government of Sri Lanka in-
vited Norway to facilitate peace talks.  Oslo had received informal requests from both 
the Sri Lankan president and the LTTE leader in order for intervening in many practi-
cal matters concerning the conﬂict in Sri Lanka.  Gradually those had transformed 
into ofﬁcial requests and were conﬁrmed in 2000.6)  As Jacob Bercovitch and Allison 
Houston write,7) mediation becomes most likely successful (62.3%), when it is demand-
ed by both parties to dispute, as opposed to just one (41.3%).
Inﬂuential Factors for the Compromise
Most countries including the United States, Canada, Australia, United Kingdom, 
and ASEAN and SAARC member countries banned the LTTE in the late 1990s as a 
terrorist organization.  UNICEF branded LTTE as one of few armed groups that em-
ploy children in the battle ﬁeld.8)  The European Union (EU) called on the member 
states to monitor the LTTE ofﬁces operating in the territory of the EU.9)  Having failed 
in its strategies to address the growing international repugnance towards them, the 
LTTE’s future prospects became gloomy.  Concerning the Government, it was affected 
by major external inﬂuences coming from the international donor countries at the 
“Paris Conference” and “Bretton Woods” institutions and hence, it needed peace to at-
tract investments.
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“Ripe Time”
The recognition of the “ripe moment” is also crucial for successful conﬂict media-
tion.  At a ripe moment the parties may ﬁnd themselves locked in a stalemate which 
brings them only an unavoidable catastrophe.  Or else they no longer see the viability 
of unilateral solution.10)  The political Advisor to the Sri Lankan President Laksiri Fer-
nando expressed his views in the interview about the ripeness of the time when Nor-
way mediated the conﬂict.  In his opinion at the end of the 1990s, the Sri Lankan mili-
tary had exerted their full strength in “Operation Jayaskuru” to capture the A-9 road, 
but could not achieve it.  On the other hand, the LTTE had begun a heavy operation 
to capture Jaffna but could not go beyond Muhamalai.  This had been a mutually 
hurting stalemate.  According to Zartman, a ripe moment is a “mutually hurting stale-
mate” where neither party is able to win the conﬂict.  It is claimed that ripeness only 
explains why the parties meet for negotiations and cannot be used to explain the out-
come of such a process.11)
Legitimate and Expert Resources
Several distinctive features of Norway contributed to its credibility.  As Laksiri Fer-
nando referred to in an interview, Norway had already gained an international reputa-
tion due to its maintained good social record as a peace broker and that brand had 
been the main convincing factor for the Government.  Personal reputation, track re-
cords, and special expertise are all constituents of the status of a mediator, which is an 
important factor determining the operational success.  Norway is one of few countries 
in the world which could maintain an excellent liberal democracy, egalitarianism in 
the society, and a favorable foreign policy towards the South.
Norway has achieved a reputation through its efforts towards peace building.  Due 
to its generous and non-coercive policy, Norway has maintained a less threatening and 
less domineering impression in the South.  Norway is one of the highest donor con-
tributors in the world.  Since 1974 the amount of aid contributed has constantly ex-
ceeded the United Nations target of 0.7% of GNP.  This reputation established the le-
gitimacy of Norway for mediation in Sri Lanka’s conﬂict.
Referent and Reward Resources
According to Touval and Zartman,12) the parties’ relations with a would-be-mediator 
are a major contributory factor for acceptability of that mediator.  This quality pertains 
to the “referent resource” of a mediator.  This referent resource based on the identiﬁ-
cation of the recipient with the inﬂuencer is built on their relationship and any sensing 
of fundamental similarity or empathy which exists.13)  Norway’s relations with Sri Lan-
ka run back to the late 1960s when it began a ﬁsheries development project in the Jaff-
na region (Northern Sri Lanka).14)  Norway had never banned the LTTE as a terrorist 
group.  This was a positive gesture to the LTTE in relational terms.  The Sri Lankan 
consular general to Norway had mentioned in the interview that there are some 15,000 
Tamils living in Oslo working for the cause of the LTTE collecting money and they 
conduct demonstrations.  This had been quite a well known fact.  This conveys that 
there was less resistance for LTTE propaganda activities in Norway.  Slim observed 
that in international mediation, “small states” as mediators may be regarded as sympa-
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thetic and trustworthy by the weaker party while being considered non-threatening by 
the more powerful.15)  Being a small state, this observation is also applicable to Nor-
way.
Norwegian Mediation and Indian Interests
The Sri Lankan conﬂict is signiﬁcant to India.  Even though it is hardly possible to 
assume that India would make any intervention in the conﬂict, still she heavily con-
cerns how the parties are going to compromise.  India would not like somebody with 
a strategic interest that would interfere with its defense policy or security policy having 
a presence in Sri Lanka.  It was the stance of a spokesperson to the Peace Secretariat 
of the Sri Lankan government who had once explained how the Indian factor mat-
tered in selecting a mediator to the conﬂict.  Norway, a “small state mediator” with no 
“super power” motives, suited the Indian concerns.  Norwegian peace envoy Eric Sol-
heim has said that Norway would recognize India’s legitimate interests in Sri Lanka, 
and had no desire to come in the way of any Indian initiative to end the extended 
conﬂict within its Southern neighbor.16)
Norway as a Facilitator
From the beginning of the mediation process, Norway described its role in the ne-
gotiations as facilitative.17)  The Advisor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway had 
once described the role of Norway in the Sri Lankan conﬂict as assisting the parties in 
their efforts to reach a political solution but not imposing a solution on them.  A signiﬁ-
cant part of Norway’s efforts had been focused on facilitating understanding between 
the parties; they had spent much time providing a channel for communication be-
tween the parties and helping them to bridge the gap between their respective posi-
tions.  In this effort, they had undertaken only those actions, such as making proposals 
or arranging meetings that the parties had explicitly requested from them.18)
According to the above self-deﬁnition, the Norwegian strategy of mediation in the 
Sri Lankan conﬂict sits at the lower end of the continuum of mediation strategies.  This 
means the provision of communication facilitation strategies where the mediator typi-
cally adopts a fairly passive role, channelling information to the parties and facilitating 
cooperation but exhibiting little control over the more formal process or substance of 
mediation.  In Sri Lanka, there is a political debate on the role of Norwegian media-
tion.  Some argue that Norway overruns the limits of its designated role of a facilitator. 
The spokesperson to the Sri Lankan government’s peace secretariat, Shanaka De Sil-
va, states that Norway would be considered just a facilitator and the Government did 
not want see them taking a role beyond that.
The Norwegian peace envoy to the Sri Lankan peace process answering my ques-
tion on the limits of the Norwegian mediation contended that there was only one limit. 
They would never do anything which was not accepted by the parties.  They would 
never do anything with the LTTE which was not accepted by the government.  Nor 
would they do anything with the government which was not accepted by the LTTE. 
When it came to talks, it was for the parties to decide.  Of course they had no way 
whatsoever of imposing peace in Sri Lanka.  Whatever the two parties in agreement 
had asked them to do, they were ready to do.  All three parties have consensus on the 
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deﬁnite role of Norway.  This consensus reduces the tendencies for misunderstand-
ings.
Memorandum of Understanding
In Sri Lanka, where relations between the disputing parties have deteriorated to the 
point that misperceptions and misinterpretations in communication were high, the 
role of Norway as an intermediary played a crucial role in achieving the task of draft-
ing a protocol in order to deﬁne a pre-negotiation.  This task was achieved on Febru-
ary 22, 2002, with the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between 
the government and the LTTE.
The communication link done by Norway via meeting with each party separately 
made the climate between disputants for the transition from destructive into construc-
tive relations.  The MoU laid the foundation for this transition.  It is comprised of four 
articles:
1.  Modalities of ceaseﬁre
2.  Measures to restore normalcy
3.  The Sri Lankan monitoring mission
4.  Entry into force, amendments, and termination of the agreement
Impacts of Ceaseﬁre Agreement
Under article 1.2 the two parties undertook not to engage in any offensive military 
operations.  Un-armed government troops as well as LTTE cadres were permitted to 
visit families and friends residing in areas under the control of the other party.  Ac-
cording to one of the LTTE cadres in Thambiluwill village of Ampara district in East-
ern Sri Lanka, he could easily move to places without any restrictions after the cease-
ﬁre and he wanted to continue that peace though that was not the real freedom he was 
waiting for.
To the question of the reasons for the long survival of that peace process, the East-
ern province development ofﬁcer to the LTTE, Ariyanayagam Chandra Nehru, an-
swered that in previous times the Government had kept the military alert, but that 
time their men had got an opportunity to travel freely.
These conciliatory attitudinal and behavioral changes during the long dragged-out 
peace process would play an important role to make the process irreversible.  Some 
external interveners try to bring about personal changes of heart and mind within in-
dividual leaders or small groups directly.19)  Norway paved the pathway to a similar 
change not by a direct approach but by an indirect approach.
The careful manipulation of communication strategies by Norway helped to pre-
vent the breakthrough of the peace process at the top-level, and time was made avail-
able for gradual changes, anticipated with implemented environmental adjustments. 
The measures taken by Article 1.8 in the MoU to disarm Tamil Para-military groups 
by the GOSL helped to reduce the number of parties involved in the conﬂict.
Measures to Restore Normalcy
Among many drastic steps taken under this article was the opening of trunk roads 
305
which had been subjected to restrictions.  The Kandy–Jaffna (A-9) and Trinco–Haba-
rana roads were opened for non-military trafﬁc of goods and passengers.  Speciﬁc mo-
dalities for this were worked out by the parties with the assistance of Norway.
My ﬁeld visit to the “Omanthai” border crossing Vavuniya district gathered valu-
able observations and facts on implications of the re-opening of the (A-9) road.  The 
general view of the people about the reopening of the road was very praiseworthy. 
They said, before the border was opened, they had to face many difﬁculties to go to 
Colombo; travelling by ship took nearly two to three days.  For that journey, earlier 
were they spending about 2,500 rupees.  But, at that moment it took only one day for 
travelling and it cost no more than 500 rupees.
According to statistics, about 7,000–8,000 people and 1,000 to 1,200 vehicles 
crossed every day into and out of the Vanni at the crossing points of “Omanthai.”20)
For normal people, who had to undergo embarrassments and pains taking procedures 
to go between North and South, that opening of the border was a giant leap forward 
for peace because there had not been any free pass to move since the war started. 
The opportunity opened up to witness the remnants of war and the people suffering 
from poverty, injustice, and inequality on both sides facilitated alleviation of prejudic-
es, myths, and misconceptions between North and South communities.  In particular, 
some people in both areas who have seen the other side after twenty years talked 
about their new insight into the commonalities of problems.  I have seen people de-
veloping sympathy towards each other.  An ordinary villager in Panama in Ampara 
district raising his idea regarding peace process pointed out that before peace, it had 
taken about ﬁve hours to go to the nearest town passing seven check points.  Now, af-
ter the removal of check points, it had taken at maximum two hours.
My overall observation about this village was that the social impact of the imple-
mentation of the MoU on the lives of villagers had been persuasive.  The absence of 
infrastructure development might have dampened the positive attitudinal changes for 
peace resulted from the initiation of the MoU.
Track II Diplomacy
The real owners of the negotiation, the grass roots-level people, hardly ﬁnd oppor-
tunities to have their voice at the negotiation table.  Socially, the assistance to the civil 
society in terms of bridge building, conﬁdence building, and the basic peace building 
process is important in raising the voice of grass roots-level people.  Looking through 
Norwegian assistance to the civil society, a signiﬁcant portion of it can be seen devoted 
to NGOs.  This complies with the Norwegian policy of prioritizing assistance to NGOs 
Table 1: Financial Assistance from the Norwegian Government to NGOs in Sri Lanka
Organizations 2001 2002 2003 Area funds allegedly used
Friend of Lanka 172,600 NOK 321,400 NOK 1,094,188 NOK East and Uva Province
Future in Our hands 588,100 NOK 380,250 NOK 366,382 NOK Central and West
Centre for Human 
Development
754,600 NOK 463,000 NOK 499,424 NOK North and East
Green Movement of Sri 
Lanka
366,300 NOK 321,400 NOK 7,726,366 NOK Unknown
Source: http://www.senter.no/money.htm, All ﬁgures in Norwegian Kroner
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in its development assistance for the South.
In observable terms, this is the main mechanism that Norway followed to cover 
Track-II diplomacy.  But the reliability of most of the NGOs as efﬁcient and promising 
agents in the peace process should be properly evaluated.  The program administrator 
of the Consortium of Humanitarian Agency in Sri Lanka expressed its general view 
on NGOs that many NGOs that mushroomed during the peace process were not gen-
uine; they somehow managed to convince donors.
According to the informants of this study, there were coordination problems and 
lack of dialogue between the NGOs and the parties in the conﬂict.  If all could negoti-
ate and build up a common mechanism and a proper plan, the efﬁciency of NGOs 
could be optimised.
The Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM)
Subject to acceptance by both parties, the Norwegian government had to appoint 
the Head of the Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission (SLMM), who was the ﬁnal authority 
regarding the interpretation of this agreement.  The SLMM was comprised of repre-
sentatives of Nordic countries.  The local monitoring committee had been established 
in Northern and Eastern districts.  Each committee consisted of ﬁve members, two ap-
pointed by the government and two by the LTTE and one international monitor ap-
pointed by the Head of Mission (HOM).
According to the agreement, in their respective districts they had to seek to resolve 
any dispute concerning the implementation of this agreement at the lowest possible 
level.  The government and LTTE appointees increased the capacity of the committee 
in order to deal with local communities.  Per Christer Larsen, assistant to the Deputy 
Head of Mission, pointed out that they had a great deal of understanding of what the 
situation was by working with and interacting with local communities.  There were, 
for example, in “Mannar” a Catholic priest and a Muslim priest as members of the 
committee.
Conversely, the presence of international monitors with comparative understanding 
of conﬂict resolution experiences in other countries would always be an asset for the 
local monitors.  Article 3.10 states, the members of the SLMM shall be given immedi-
ate access to areas where violation of the agreement is taking place.  Article 3.11 states, 
it shall be the responsibility of the SLMM to take immediate actions on any complaint 
made by either party to the agreement and to enquire into and assist the parties in the 
Figure 2:  Summary of Recorded Complaints and Violations of CFA from All Districts (SLMM) 
(Period 01.02.2002–30.11.2004)
Source: Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission Report, 2005
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settlement of any dispute that might arise in connection with such complaints.  With-
out responding based on objective and sober assessment of the reports of violation of 
ceaseﬁre agreement, it would certainly be difﬁcult for the parties to proceed further in 
the peace process.  The ceaseﬁre created by the MoU was an innovative initiation di-
rected at conﬁdence building.  In terms of this objective, the SLMM might have been 
the most important article of the MoU.  It was at the center of the most sensitive and 
crucial issues needed to develop conﬁdence and trust between the parties.  As moni-
tors to witness the breaching of conﬁdence or the violation of the ceaseﬁre agreement, 
they undoubtedly attract the peak attention of not only the parties but also of public 
opinion.  On the one hand, the presence of them helped parties to extend their rela-
tions into a third dimension.  On the other hand, since then has it been a third party 
to be responsible and to be blamed for the violations.  Due to the growing number of 
violations of the Ceaseﬁre Agreement (CFA), the SLMM were subjected to many criti-
cisms and discontent.
As was evident from media and protests, the opinion of most of Sri Lankan people 
was that the SLMM had not being operated at its optimal level in order to discourage 
further breeches from taking place.  I asked Larsen the opinion of the SLMM on the 
growing discontent of people.  He had observed the fact that some groups, especially 
media, had directed many criticisms toward them, but they had being working within 
the limits.  The CFA had allowed the SLMM only for reporting, recommending, and 
inﬂuencing responsible bodies to take appropriate action.
But people expected a vigorous mechanism to restore justice.  A member of the 
Elam Peoples Democratic Party (EPDP), a rival Tamil political party to the LTTE, said 
that they were disarmed at the beginning of the MoU.  Then the LTTE had begun 
hunting their defenseless people; the LTTE had killed 170 members by then.  He 
claimed that they had not gained any justice.
These people desperate for justice aired their anger at the SLMM.  People demon-
strated in front of the Norwegian embassy asking for decent justice.  As Larsen com-
mented on the justiﬁability of directing these accusations for Norwegian mediation 
due to the work of the SLMM, it was absolutely unjustiﬁable.  That was independent 
from Norwegian mediation.  The necessary codes for the SLMM had been formulated 
by the parties, and the SLMM had worked for those parties, not to the mediator.
But as article 3.2 of the MoU states, being subjected to acceptance by the parties, 
the Norwegian government would appoint the head of the SLMM, who would be the 
authority regarding interpretation of this agreement.  It had already been tied to the 
politics of the peace process.  Mainly due to this reason, the SLMM lacked the neces-
sary and sufﬁcient political distance from the negotiating process to appear being inde-
pendent from the mediator.  When the same country is involved in both processes, 
people ﬁnd it difﬁcult to identify the difference of interests between the SLMM and 
the facilitator role.
The difﬁculty in running these two processes independent of each other was appar-
ent in some incidents.  Once, a leading newspaper in Sri Lanka, Divayina,21) reported 
controversial behavior of an SLMM ofﬁcer under the heading, “Norwegians hostile 
acts have been revealed.”  Even though these incidents seemed isolated and personal, 
they made a signiﬁcant negative impact on how people perceive the role of mediator, 
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his authenticity, and neutrality.
Keeping Parity between Parties
Because of the structural asymmetry of internal conﬂicts, mediators must combine 
the most intrusive of the three mediation roles: manipulation of the other two, com-
munication, and formulation.  As communicators, mediators merely carry messages, 
overcoming the procedural communication gap between parties; as formulators, me-
diators should put forward their own ideas about possible outcomes, overcoming the 
substantive communication gap; but as manipulators mediators have to be involved in 
sharpening the stalemate and sweetening the proposed outcome.22)  Norwegian media-
tors in the Sri Lankan conﬂict have worked basically as communicators.
But subtle manipulator acts have also been used on their way to making the peace 
process efﬁcient.  Norway had provided communication equipment to the LTTE in 
2003.  This has been a controversial issue in the political dialog regarding the media-
tor role.  In the conference of “Road Maps to Peace in Sri Lanka” conducted on Au-
gust 20, 2004, at Kongressenter, Folkets hus in Oslo by the World Alliance for Peace 
in Sri Lanka (WAPS), Susantha Goonatilake suggested that the Norwegian govern-
ment’s involvement in importing radio equipment had implied that future attacks of 
the LTTE could have been coordinated more efﬁciently and effectively.  That was 
electronic equipment with the highest available degree of security from interception, 
and even the Sri Lankan government did not possess such sophisticated radio equip-
ment.
The Norwegian Aftenposten newspaper reported that incident under the heading 
“More criticism for peace broker.”23)  In that article, Jehan Perera, director of National 
Peace Council in Colombo, Sri Lanka, noted that the importation of six tons of elec-
tronic equipment for the LTTE had been focused on in Sri Lankan media for about a 
year, criticizing the stance of the Sri Lankan government to approve the radio equip-
ment earmarked for broadcasting the LTTE’s political message.  The controversy was 
that it was the Norwegian authorities who had imported the equipment in an irregular 
way, under diplomatic protection, to avoid taxation.  This was an LTTE condition, but 
there had been no attention by Norwegian authorities to the probability of using that 
equipment for military ends, even if radio equipment can obviously be used for such a 
purpose.
In my interview with Solheim, he replied to a question on this issue, stating that it 
was done in coordination with the Sri Lankan government.  They had assisted the 
LTTE in this communication equipment because they had felt that it would be beneﬁ-
cial to the LTTE to communicate easily with the government of Sri Lanka in order to 
move the peace process forward.
Here the mediator relates resources to the mediation process to increase the efﬁ-
ciency of the peace process.  In theoretical terms, the mediator has used his strategic 
strength in mediation with the aim of altering the behavior of a party.  Strategic 
strength in mediation is an aspect of social power that relates to the resources and re-
lationships the mediator brings to the conﬂict.24)  Mediation is goal-directed behavior, 
and it is a matter of inﬂuencing the other’s behavior.25)  For that, the issue of what to 
do and when to do it is a central concern in mediation.  There is no doubt that there 
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are more questions than clear-cut answers in the matter of what is effective in media-
tion.  Knowing what to do and when with the appropriate touch is what makes the 
“art” of mediation so salient.26)  In particular, in a civil war, more sensitive and crucial 
issues are involved, making it more difﬁcult for the mediator to decide.  One of the 
problems mediators have is how to bridge the gap between the “rebels” and the gov-
ernment without threatening the sense of sovereignty of the latter.27)
In the Sri Lankan conﬂict, not only the sovereignty of Sri Lanka but also that of In-
dia is involved, making it even harder for the mediator.  As a leading Sri Lankan 
newspaper, Sunday Divayina, once pointed out, the Indian Intelligence Service (RAW) 
was particularly concerned over the ability gained by the LTTE from this equipment 
to expand its radio transmission territory to South India as it could be used to promul-
gate South Indian separatism.  The threat from the LTTE to Indian sovereignty was 
expressed in the Home Ministry’s annual report in 2004, mentioning the LTTE as an 
extremely potent, most lethal, and well-organized terrorist force with strong connec-
tions in Tamilnadu and pockets of Southern India.28)  It has been linked to “Tamil 
chauvinist” elements who are inspired by the Tamil Elam concept for a separate Tam-
ilnadu.
The mediator’s involvement in assisting parties to the conﬂict regarding material 
items can affect his image of neutrality.  Due to the availability to get to know these 
events from the media, it will considerably inﬂuence peoples’ image of the mediator. 
Most of the people in informal interviews with me conveyed the belief that Norwe-
gians use their authority and resources to tip the balance of the outcome.  Taking into 
account that “empowerment” might affect the neutrality of the third party, both Wehr 
and Modelski suggest that the “empowerment” actions be undertaken by an actor oth-
er than the intermediary who is willing to work in conjunction with the latter for the 
beneﬁt of the conﬂict resolution process.29)
There were other international actors lending its sponsorship to this peace process 
in Sri Lanka.  Japan, the European Union, and the United States were also lending 
hands in the peace process.30)  If the above material assistance was done via one of 
those donors to Sri Lanka, it could not have damaged the image of the mediator.  An-
other provocative incident was cited in a Sri Lankan newspaper, under the heading 
“Military advice to a group of tigers from Norwegian Rena Military Camp.”31)  The 
newspaper stated that a visit organized by the Norwegian foreign ministry for a group 
of LTTE people to Norway with a published intension of political discussion has actu-
ally had the hidden intention to give military training.  The article quotes a Norwegian 
website to show what it claims to be the published purpose of this visit.  As it had been 
reported, the web site stated that a delegation of representatives from the Sri Lankan 
tigers had arrived in Norway to discuss the political situation in their country and they 
would meet with the foreign minister, Jan Peterson, and others engaged in the Norwe-
gian efforts to facilitate peace talks in Sri Lanka.
During the formal interviews with Sri Lankan government representatives I asked 
their opinion about the question of the facilitator’s duplicity and partiality as that 
newspaper was trying to suggest.  The spokesperson to the government peace secre-
tary refused to talk on speciﬁc issues.  The personal view of Laksri Fernando (an advi-
sor to the government) on this particular issue was that Norway had said that they had 
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not given any military training but had showed only how they operate in peace keep-
ing; whatever they needed to do, taking them to a military camp at that time would 
bring about suspicions.  Laksri Fernando does not think that they had any ulterior mo-
tives, but were naïve; as an impartial intermediary they had to be more careful than 
that.
On April 2, 2003, the ofﬁcial website of Norwegian Defence published the same 
news under the heading of “Tigers visiting Rena” and contended that a group of the 
LTTE peace secretariat delegation visited the Norwegian defence and Rena camp.32)
In that article, a former Head of the SLMM and retired Military General, Trond Fu-
ruhovde, has written that they were at that time assisting the foreign ministry as orga-
nizer of the LTTE visit.  The purpose of that visit was for the Tigers to see how differ-
ent types of defense forces are organized and how they functioned.  Tigers would 
retain the knowledge gained about military matters, as well as knowledge about the 
ways of a democratic government, as practiced by the Nordic countries.  Later they 
would come up with their own ways of establishing similar practices in a peaceful Sri 
Lanka, alongside the Sinhalese.  They had felt that the tigers had already come a long 
way in the transition from being a guerrilla movement to becoming a political appara-
tus.
The Norwegian foreign ministry had given demonstrations in military matters to 
the Tigers with the assumption that peace is inevitable.  The Sri Lankan peace process 
was in its pre-negotiation phase where the parties were still developing understanding. 
Every pre-negotiation attempt would not result in negotiation.  This fact was evident 
in pre-negotiation efforts in the history of the Sri Lankan conﬂict.  Even if Norwegian 
facilitators by their experience with the parties had sensed that the LTTEs would have 
transformed into peaceful bodies and they would never use the knowledge gained 
about the military matters in a future war, it would have been for the relief of every-
body that they could engage both parties for the session.
A mediator should not be met with any difﬁculty in inviting parties to the conﬂict to 
the same session on a stage where he could predict that all parties would work side-
by-side peacefully in the future; then nobody would have to become nervous because 
it has been done with the agreement of all parties to the conﬂict.  Kristin Doubinson 
has stated that the Norwegian mediators were naïve, and sees that as a weakness in 
their approach to peace.  She quotes a former Norwegian foreign minister, Jan Ege-
land, who has said that one of the most important lessons Norwegians have learnt was 
that they must not be naïve democrats who believe that all parties come to the negoti-
ating table with a true desire for peace.33)
Doubinson then argues that a certain amount of naivete when choosing to intervene 
in some of the world’s most protracted conﬂicts can, however, be an advantage.  As 
Egeland hinted above, if he and his colleagues had been fully aware of what they were 
stepping into, they would probably never have got involved in the ﬁrst place.34)
From another angle, I see those events as the mediator’s efforts to keep healthy re-
lations with the parties to the conﬂict.  Relational tactics pertain to mollifying relation-
ships between the mediator and the parties, and modifying such relationships toward 
the success of mediation.  Providing an empathetic ear, responding to necessities, and 
giving rewards at times develop a bond between the mediator and the particular party. 
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This bond may be strong enough to drag the party to the pre-negotiation phase, pro-
viding time for transformation.  With time, the bond would develop to an extent that 
the party will be incapable of saying “no” to the mediator.  On the other hand, helping 
to keep equity, Norway could have reduced the asymmetry of the conﬂict as the medi-
ator.
Mediators often empower weaker parties in the interest of an equitable settlement 
to end human misery.35)  So the legitimacy given to the LTTE and strengthening it by 
material and psychological means can also be seen as an attempt of the mediator to 
provide equitable condition for both parties to redress asymmetry.  More often the 
mediators are likely to have feelings and interests that are the bases for sympathy to-
wards one party compared with another.  How they act on such convictions is another 
matter, however.  Some may strive to act even-handed or to be an advocate on both 
sides; others act to assist one side more than another or to advance their own interests. 
Such action may be more or less energetically pursued.36)  One of the basic ﬁndings 
about the negotiation processes internationally is that those function best under condi-
tions of equality, and indeed only take place when the parties have some form of a 
mutual veto over outcomes.37)  Many have argued that the probability of the success of 
an intermediary’s effort is related to the existence of at least a rough parity of power 
between the conﬂicting parties.38)  They justify this argument saying that if there is a 
marked difference in power between the contenders, the stronger party would expect 
total victory.
A question arises about how the mediator could be involved in “empowerment” or 
contrivance of stalemate without jeopardizing his neutral position in the conﬂict.  How 
can the mediator maintain neutrality and therefore acceptability, in the eyes of the 
stronger party while taking sides with the weaker party to face up to its opponent? 
Most of the remarks on Norwegian mediation I heard from people were about its fail-
ure to maintain neutrality.  I can conclude that to win over the credibility of all the 
parties and from ordinary people, Norway had to be careful about taking actions 
which might have endangered its image of impartiality.
The mediator’s partiality can be viewed from another angle in relation to possible 
rewards he can gain in the cause of mediation.  There are three major types of rewards 
as described by Mitchell which motivate mediators to intervene in conﬂicts as well as 
determine partiality to some extent as described above:
Process rewards (rewards gained through “engaging in the behavior of an inter-
mediary, irrespective of outcome”)
Achievement rewards (rewards gained through “achieving some form of settle-
ment of the dispute which is at least minimally satisfactory to the parties”)
Settlement rewards (rewards gained through “achieving a particular, sort—after 
settlement, which, apart from at least minimally satisfying the parties, also ad-
vances the interests of the intermediary”).39)
According to Zartman, the motivation to change or inﬂuence and the expectation of 
goal-achievement are the reasons why so many international actors are keen to medi-
ate.40)  A successful mediation proved by a peaceful negotiation is a process reward for 
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Norway, whose foreign policy promotes international recognition and prestige in 
peace work.
Peace Talks
The most evident component of facilitation by Norway for the Sri Lankan peace 
process is basically political.  Norway facilitated a background acceptable for both par-
ties for direct talks between the two parties.  There had been ﬁve negotiating sessions:
 i. September 16–18, 2002 —at Sattahip, Thailand
 ii. October 31–November 3, 2002 —at Rose Garden Hotel, Thailand
 iii. December 2–5, 2002 —in Oslo, Norway
 iv. January 6–9, 2003 —at Rose Garden Hotel, Thailand
 v. February 7–8, 2003 —at Embassy of Norway, Berlin, Germany.
The ﬁrst two direct talks held in Thailand had produced some positive as well as nega-
tive outcomes.  Economic reconstruction in a peace process is an indispensable com-
ponent.  In the ﬁrst round of talks, both parties decided to establish a “task force” to 
handle matters regarding this.
In the second round it was decided to setup two sub-committees instead of task 
forces:
 i.  Sub-Committee on Immediate and Rehabilitation Needs in North and East 
(SIHRN)
 ii.  A Sub-committee on De-escalation and Normalisation.
There was also agreement to set up a third sub-committee:
 iii.  Sub-committee on political matters; this sub-committee was to be chaired by 
the heads of the two delegations to the peace talks.
This sub-committee agreed to discuss political subjects.  At this time, the Sri Lankan 
government initiated a huge campaign under the banner “invest in peace.”41)  Even 
though the economic themes were highlighted in the basic agreements, it has become 
hollow in practice due to the lack of efﬁciency in implementing the economic projects. 
Lakshman Yapa (MP), a Deputy Minister in the former government involved in talks 
and implantation of committees, admitted that the SIHRN committee was not suc-
cessful because they had not been able to utilize the money efﬁciently to achieve the 
objectives set out.
The failure of the SIHRN committee was a negative impact to the peace process. 
This was a place where the peace process was hindered at the Track II level.  Out of 
the ﬁve negotiating sessions held, the third became a landmark in terms of the quest 
for a political solution.  The possibility of a federal solution within a united Sri Lanka 
and the resettlement of refugees were explored.  Resettlement and de-mining were 
started.  Ironically, this positive transformation could not be maintained long when 
the LTTE denied that they had reached any consensus on a federal solution in the 
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Oslo session.42)  This was a moment where everybody turned to the mediator and ex-
pected to hear the truth from him, the neutral intermediary, who was present at talks. 
In the second phase of discussion, the LTTE presented its political proposals for an In-
terim Self Governing Authority (ISGA).  The LTTE put conditions for further discus-
sions.  A main condition was that discussion should only be based on ISGA proposals. 
Amidst many debates over the ISGA, the ruling UNP was ﬂexible to discuss the 
LTTE’s conditions.  The contradicting standpoints of the two political parties have 
stalled the peace process with no sign of motion beyond proposals for an ISGA.
Meanwhile, the increasing violations of the ceaseﬁre and threats unleashed after the 
removal of military barriers led to social unrest.  Four Tamil political parties took legal 
action against the parties to the MoU for having disarmed them and putting them in 
jeopardy.43)  The ruling party was criticized for jeopardizing the country’s security.
The president decided to take over three ministries under her ofﬁce, including the 
defense ministry.44)  Disputes began between the president and the ruling party.  Nor-
way withdrew from its mediation role at the end of 2003 on the grounds of disagree-
ment between the president and the ruling party.
In mediation, a key source of the strength of the mediator comes from the dispu-
tants’ need for the mediator’s involvement in ﬁnding solutions to their problems.45)
This source of strength is exercised when the mediator has a threatening power to ter-
minate mediation.46)  With the disunity between the president and the ruling party, the 
mediator faced the difﬁculty of identifying clearly the spokespeople for the govern-
ment.  The cohesiveness existing within each conﬂicting party is important to establish 
the clear identity of the parties.  If there is disunity within the parties, it may be impos-
sible even to clearly identify them in the ﬁrst place.
A main criticism directed towards the government was that it had no consensus 
over the national problem.47)  Shanaka De Silva, the spokesperson to the government 
peace secretariat, described the lack of unity in the government with regard to matters 
in the peace process.  According to him, the government’s position on the peace pro-
cess had always been communicated through the President.  The President had been 
elected in our own right not as a coalition party person.  This whole idea of multiplici-
ty of voices was something that the LTTE was raising for their advantage.  Multiplicity 
of voices in the South is good.  This is pluralism.  If someone wants to eliminate this 
multiplicity of voices, then that one has to do what the LTTE was doing, kill-off any-
body that has a different opinion.
The 2004 general election had a substantial impact on the peace process.  The 
LTTE re-formed its political counterpart, the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) for this 
election.  The TNA gained overall 52% of the total valid votes cast in the Northern–
Eastern province.48)  The government was changed on this election.  The ruling Unit-
ed National Party (UNP) lost in this election and a coalition of the Peoples Alliance 
and the “Marxist” Peoples Liberation Party ( JVP) came into power.  In April 2004 the 
new government invited Norwegian mediators to restart the stalled mediation.  By Au-
gust 2004, there was debate among the main political parties on the continuation of 
the peace process.  The new government’s position, as expressed by a spokesperson of 
the government peace secretariat in one of my interviews, was a very proud one about 
the fact that the LTTE had prepared a political proposal for the ﬁrst time.
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But the Government claimed that the LTTE must insist that it would only be their 
document.  This shows that they were being intransigent; they were making the situa-
tion very hard to move.  The LTTE’s standpoint was given in a heroes’ day presenta-
tion by the leader of the LTTE.  There, he said that they had always been consistent 
with their policy with regard to their struggle for self-determination.  Tamil home land, 
Tamil nationality, and Tamil’s right to self determination were the fundaments that un-
derlined their political struggle.  They had been insisting on those fundaments from 
Thimpu (1984) to Thailand (2003).
Sunil Hadunneththi, the Deputy Minister of Small Industries (MP) and a politburo 
member of the JVP (a party to the coalition government), said that the ISGA was a gi-
ant leap towards separation.  As he pointed out, any person who genuinely believes in 
equality and opposes separatism must have seen that separatism should be defeated 
and equal rights for all communities established.  Otherwise, the future of all commu-
nities in Sri Lanka would be chaotic and destructive.  TNA Parliamentarian Sivashak-
thi Ananthan, viewing the present situation, expressed that they had already descend-
ed from Elam.
The JVP was pressing them to go back for a separate state.  If they were compelled 
to do that, the responsibility had to be taken by the JVP-pioneered nationalists.  They 
had put their demands on the table.  If the government was not ready to talk, they 
would have an alternative and they would have to conform to their leader.  Galtung, 
applying his experience in mediation to the Sri Lankan peace process, points out that 
the problem was not lack of conﬁdence or lack of trust as such but the lack of good 
ideas.49)  The way to have good ideas was to have good dialogues, not debates but dia-
logues.  The mediator would know much less about the conﬂict but would know more 
about conﬂicts in general.
Considering the Sri Lankan protracted conﬂict, Norway has a vast capacity to facili-
tate with its expertise and legitimizing resources.  There could have been a real threat 
to the negotiation process if the ceaseﬁre had been left isolated from parallel and sup-
porting political parties.  In reality, it seemed that not only the parallel and supporting 
political parties, but also the masses from all kinds of groups had been undervalued in 
terms of their capacity to manipulate the negotiations.
Conclusion
In the Sri Lankan conﬂict, several peace efforts attempted by the Sri Lankan gov-
ernment and the LTTE collapsed mostly due to misperception and misinterpretation 
of communication between parties.  In this context, Norway, a small state mediator, 
entered into the conﬂict to ﬁll the communication gap between the two parties.  In 
terms of Zartman’s equalization of stalemate to ripeness, the Sri Lankan conﬂict was to 
be identiﬁed a ripe moment at the time of mediation.  The MoU signed between the 
two parties for a ceaseﬁre laid the atmosphere for a pre-negotiation phase.  There are 
both positive and negative effects of establishing a pre-negotiation period prior to the 
negotiation.  The conditions made by the MoU to restore normalcy worked positively 
to change attitudes, behaviors, and contexts of the conﬂict between parties.  But there 
were some shortcomings of the MoU itself and inefﬁciencies when it came to the im-
plementation phase.  The Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission lacked institutional and per-
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sonal resources for optimal functioning.  Involvement in the work of the monitoring 
mission affected badly the image of neutrality of the mediator’s role.  The increasing 
violations erupted during the ceaseﬁre caused enormous societal tensions risking the 
ceaseﬁre agreement.  It seemed to be necessary to address the conceptual and human 
security shortcomings of the CFA, and to elaborate with the parties towards a consoli-
dated ceaseﬁre agreement including a set of conﬁdence and security building mea-
sures.  The media had a substantial impact on people’s attitudes towards the mediator. 
Norway as a facilitator had been subjected to criticisms mainly regarding neutrality.
The moderate mentality of the mediator towards cultural differences and the com-
plexity of the conﬂict had made him more vulnerable for criticism-prone actions.  In 
the time that was available, he could have contributed to a constructive transformation 
by cultivating a reasonable understanding about the socio-cultural making of the par-
ties concerned.  As the nature of opportunities that had arisen was delicate, it would 
better if all parties urgently had gained a complex view of the conﬂict and adopted 
compatible strategies analyzing a range of viable options.
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